




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9. Calling Publics into Existence: The Political Arts of Public Management

Mark H. Moore, Archon Fung

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Calling Publics into Existence: The Political Arts of Public Management

How best to integrate democratic politics into the management of public enterprises has been a central question in public administration for over a century.¹ On the one hand, all writers in the field recognize the critical importance of democratic political processes in legitimating state action—not only the state’s use of public authority in regulatory and enforcement activities but also its use of tax dollars to provide goods and services. On the other hand, the processes of democratic legitimation create significant problems for the efficient and effective management of government in both practical and philosophical terms.²

Politics and Public Management: The Debate

At the practical level, the processes of democratic legitimation expose government managers to a continuing, contentious public debate about the important public values that should be *pursued by*, and *reflected in*, government operations. This debate occurs in *advance* of government action, as citizens and their representatives argue about whether and how government should act to deal with a particular social condition nominated as a public problem to be solved. The debate continues *subsequent* to government action, as citizens and their representatives call the government to account for its performance.³ The debate focuses not only on the proper *ends* of government (the ideas of the good and just that provide the *raison d’être* for government action) but also on the best and fairest *means* for achieving those collectively established ends.

The continuing debate undermines effective public management in two key ways. First, responding to the continuing debate distracts managers from

the important task of running their agencies. Second, the debate introduces uncertainty and vacillation among those whom managers are trying to rally to do the necessary work.

At a philosophical level, focusing on democratic legitimacy raises important questions about the fairness and justice of government operations as well as their efficiency and effectiveness.⁴ This makes accounting for the public value produced by the government both different and harder than answering the simple question, what works?⁵ Managers must also answer the question of whether the government is acting fairly, is protecting individual rights, and is helping to create more just conditions in the wider society.

Given the normative desirability of imbuing government action with democratic legitimacy, on the one hand, and the obstacles that processes of legitimation can pose to successful executive management, on the other, it is not surprising that theorists of public administration and public management have tried to sweep the problem of politics under the rug. They did so first at the turn of the twentieth century by trying to establish a reliable temporal distinction between *policy* on one hand, and *operations* on the other.⁶ Policymaking was understood to be the realm within which debate occurred about the ends and means of government and were resolved in relatively clear and coherent articulations of the will of the people. Implementation was understood to be the sphere within which administrative experts found the means to achieve the desired purposes with the available resources as efficiently and effectively (and as fairly) as possible.

They did so again in the late 1980s and early 1990s effort to create a “new public management” that focused on creating a “customer oriented government.”⁷ In this view, “focusing on the customer” promised to bypass the problem of politics by seeing the body politic not as a collective that had to find some way to become articulate about its collectively defined purposes and commitments but instead as a collection of individuals who, like customers in the private sector, retained their right to decide what was valuable in government policy operations to them as individuals. On this view, the arbiter of public value was not the collective formed through the messy processes of democratic government but instead was each individual in society who was entitled to his own views of value. Just as the private sector created value by satisfying the desires of individual customers, so the public sector could create public value by satisfying the desires of individual citizens and clients. To accomplish this goal, government did not have to engage in the arduous political task of creating an articulate collective; it simply had to make its operations transparent to citizens and its transactions with

individual citizens attuned to their individual desires. Public value would register in the individual valuations made by individual citizens and clients.

The Crucial Role of Democratic Politics in Achieving Managerial Success

In our view, neither of these efforts to exclude democratic politics from public management can succeed. Fortunately, we are not alone in thinking this. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in the midst of the Progressive Era that sought to banish politics from public administration, John Dewey argued that if public managers—and society more generally—were to succeed in deploying publicly authority and money to achieve publicly valued results, they had to learn how to “call a public into existence having a common interest in controlling” the negative consequences of their interactions together.⁸ We agree with Dewey. In our view, bringing the techniques of successful democratic political engagement to the public manager’s work is crucial for both normative and practical reasons.

Normatively, we think that the important processes of democratic elections can only go so far to legitimate government action. Elections are too rare and too crude to provide useful guidance for the broad range of government action. If it is a virtue for *all* government action to be legitimated by explicit expressions of public support, then creating more forums in which citizens can participate in important choices about how to use state authority and money will advance the cause of democratic government. Beyond elections, and beyond the formal consultative processes of legislatures and administrative rule-making legislatures, lie many opportunities for governments to reach out for consultation and advice about how public assets might best be deployed in particular domains.⁹ The use of such mechanisms might help to close the legitimacy gap that is experienced in many democratic governments, even those that are relatively far advanced. They might also help to solve problems of governance and accountability in countries in which democratic traditions are less well established.

Practically, we think that these consultative mechanisms can make democratic government more efficient and effective in the pursuit of its mandated goals. The reason is simple: in democratic governance, individual citizens are important not only because they *authorize* the government to pursue a particular goal but also because they help the government *operationally achieve* the desired goal.¹⁰ They do so by putting their own shoulders to the capstan. This is true every time the government asks citizens to pay taxes (on

pain of legal prosecution if they do not). It is true every time the government asks individuals to protect their own health (and reduce the financial and economic burden that their ill health creates for others) by driving safely, eating better, and exercising more. It is true every time the government seeks to manage the threat of global warming by requiring firms to reduce their polluting activities or by subsidizing the use of clean technologies. And it is true every time the government seeks to improve the impact and fairness of educational opportunities by reaching out to parents to work with the schools to leverage the school's influence over their children. If individual citizens cannot be mobilized to contribute actively to the achievement of public purposes, they will not be achieved.

In our view, there is simply no way to sweep politics under the rug. Public managers in democratic societies have to deploy the arts of political as well as administrative management. This is the theory we have been developing. And it is the utility of that theory that we mean to test by applying it to the problem faced by Captain Suzanne Englebert.

Captain Englebert's Problem

At the outset, it seems that a theory that emphasized engaging political processes to legitimate government action would have relatively little to offer Captain Englebert. After all, at the outset of the case, Captain Englebert had no formal authority to deploy that would require democratic legitimation! No body of public law required citizens to protect the security of the ports. No public money could subsidize or directly purchase private efforts to enhance port security. Indeed, many social actors who had interests and capacities related to port security were not even citizens of the United States! If Englebert were only a small part of the U.S. government, if the U.S. government were only one actor among many, and if the solution of the problem required action from those not subject to U.S. law, then the problem she faced could not be simply the problem of legitimating U.S. government action. Instead, she had to identify processes that used her position in the government *to mobilize actors who are largely independent of government authority*.

In chapter 7 of this volume, Stephen Goldsmith argues that Captain Englebert should think of herself as managing a network rather than a hierarchical organization. That is helpful insofar as it points to the fact that the operational capacities needed to improve port security are distributed across many organizations. But Goldsmith's view of a network focuses more on the operational challenge of realigning capacities to achieve goals than it

does on precisely how large numbers of largely independent actors might be motivated to cooperate in a joint task. As a mayor, Goldsmith routinely used the authority of his office to focus the attention of multiple government organizations on a single complex problem.¹¹ He also used his wider political powers to engage the civic and for-profit sectors in the doing of public work. But he always started with both the formal powers and the informal political influences of an elected chief executive.

In Englebert's case, however, the network was more diffuse than those described by Goldsmith, and her position was much weaker. The organizations she needed to mobilize formed a network only in the loosest sense. They were functionally bound together by their combined interest in, and capacity to produce, improved port security. But they may not have been fully aware of the details of their functional interdependence nor how those could be exploited to create joint value. They had worked together in the past to take advantage of functional interdependencies associated with maritime trade, so they had some experience of working together. But they had never faced this particular task before. These facts together established them as a *latent* network that could be motivated and able to act to improve port security. But it was by no means clear whether or how the latent potential of that functional network could be activated. No one was assigned the responsibility or had the authority to take the lead in defining a purpose, committing independent actors to that purpose, finding effective means of achieving that purpose, and distributing the burdens and benefits of achieving the purpose in a fair as well as efficient and effective manner. No one was given a pot of money to spread around to attract commitment and effort.

These observations suggest that Captain Englebert's problem was less the narrow political challenge of legitimating government action taken by a powerful executive agency than it was to perform the more complex task of "calling a public into existence that can understand and act on its own interests."¹² Her challenge was at once *prior* to the use of executive authority (in the sense that she had to create a context in which a collectively constructed shared urgency for dealing with a problem can substitute—functionally—for the existence of formal authority) and *subsequent* to executive decision-making (in that it sought to ensure effective implementation by actors who were not under her administrative control). Her bureaucratic position could be used to convene a wider public deliberation to mobilize and guide action, but if so, it would be through the mobilization of an informal collective agreement that hardened into shared expectations (and perhaps negotiated regulations), not through the immediate and direct use of state authority. In

short, *it was precisely because she lacked formal authority to get the job done that she had to rely heavily on wider political processes that mobilize social action above and beyond what government could order.* She had to think of herself as leading a social movement, not just as changing an organization.¹³

To say that she had to think and act as a leader of a political movement is not to take her away from her job. She is an officer of the U.S. Coast Guard, not a civil rights leader or a community organizer. But the paradox is that her administrative job required her to become a skillful political mobilizer. She could not achieve the goal she was assigned without finding the means not only to aggregate the capacities of different organizations into an effective machine for enhancing port security but also to find the means to motivate and mobilize those she did not control. To make that stretch, she had to rely on some kind of political process to mobilize both consent and a capacity to act that existed independently of her particular formal authority. She could be helped along in this by the existence of some formal authority that gave her a platform to use—a kind of bully pulpit. But if she were to build a sufficient governance capacity to guide the network actors toward improved performance, she had to construct the influence and authority of that governance structure through persuasion and exhortation as well as through the use of the government's money and authority.

Similarly, to say her task was largely a political one is not to say that she did not face a technical and operational problem as well. Indeed, what made her task so hard was that she has to, in the end, meet a demanding set of technical and operational challenges. Together, she and others in the latent network had to figure out the practical means for improving port security. Unless they could meet the operational requirements of this challenge, she would have failed. And it is this part of her job that remained operational, managerial, and technical. A good sound bite would not protect the ports. Lots of general enthusiasm would not lead to the particular actions that could improve port security.

The particular combination of political and technical challenges that Captain Englebert faced could be relatively rare; if so, this experience is better seen as a special case than one that can illustrate the general burdens on public managers. Yet many public management scholars are beginning to view situations in which public managers' formal authority falls well short of being sufficient to achieve the desired results as the rule rather than the exception.¹⁴ If public authority is often limited in this way, then the political techniques associated with both legitimating the actions of government and mobilizing effective action from many independent actors will become much more

central to effective managerial action. All public managers may have to learn to use the bully pulpit. This, at any rate, is the argument we wish to make.

We begin by rehearsing the managerial justifications for political engagement on behalf of both democratic legitimation of state action and the mobilization of effective social action. Along the way, we discuss actions taken by Captain Englebert that seem to be consistent with the theory we are developing. We then present a way of thinking about the tools available to managers for engaging their political environment—ways of calling a public into existence that can legitimate governmental action, extend its influence, and produce important social results. Finally, we conclude with observations about the strengths and limitations of our theory in helping Captain Englebert do her important public, governmental work.

Democratic Political Management: Why Building Legitimacy and Support for Public Action Is Important

An important trend in the theory of public management has been to encourage public managers—those entrusted with the authority and money of states—to focus more attention and effort on engaging rather than avoiding the political currents that swirl around them, their agencies, and their efforts to create the good and just society.¹⁵ Some have viewed this advice as antidemocratic, as an invitation for public managers to subvert democratic politics for their own self-interested purposes.¹⁶

Our view is the opposite. A principal task confronting all public managers is to find ways to legitimate, in the eyes of the public, the actions that they and their agencies take. They cannot legitimate their actions without engaging the political world in ways that help public managers understand and enact what the public wishes them to do. Moreover, in a world in which public managers are called to account for achieving purposes that go well beyond their formal authority and depend on their capacity to mobilize a large number of formally independent social actors to help them achieve their goals, they must turn to the methods of political engagement to meet the expectations placed on them.

The Legitimacy Gap in Democratic Governance

In the past, we hoped that the task of legitimating government action could be left largely to the machinery of public administrators, directed by elected representatives. In this conception, elections and the choices made by those elected provided all the legitimacy that a democratic government needed.

But modern realities have shown that this ideal is wrong.¹⁷ Politicians of many stripes have come to understand that there are real limits to the kind of legitimacy that can be delivered through periodic but still rare public elections. There are always issues ignored in electoral politics that surface in the course of governing and that require a different kind of legitimation. Conditions in the world often change rapidly so that commitments made in elections seem to be less compelling over time. As experience accumulates about the success or failure of particular governmental efforts, there are always reasons to reconsider established government policies. And while it has never been quite true that elections were about purposes and administration was about means, there are always enough detailed technical questions as to means (and their consequences for individual citizens and groups!) that need a closer and different kind of consulting than is typical of elections.

As a result of this legitimacy gap, public managers must often be concerned with political consultation and the mobilization of legitimacy and support as well as with the technical execution of well-defined, stable, policy mandates warranted by elections. Governments of many kinds have increasingly sought to reduce the legitimacy gap by surveying citizens about their experiences and views and by relying on and experimenting with new methods of public consultation and deliberation.¹⁸ This is largely in the interest of increasing the responsiveness of government operations not only to individual clients of government but also to political and social communities that are smaller and different than the political communities that come into existence during election campaigns.

But moves to close the legitimacy gap are also important in mobilizing action from those who can make useful contributions to the solution of public problems. Sometimes, as in the case of port security, the problems are international and multisectoral. Other times, as in the case of public education, the problems are more local and more narrowly focused on government action alone. But whether large or small, the problems all depend on a certain amount of quasi-voluntary, public-spirited action to get the job done. Englebert had to rely on the willingness of the port communities to see what could be done, to share that knowledge, and to take the necessary actions. A local school superintendent has to rely on parents and other community-based organizations to create an environment of high academic expectations and performance to achieve her goals. None of the quasi-volunteer action is available for use without doing the political work of building a strong sense of interdependence and mutual responsibility.

To provide clear operational guidance about the nature of this work, it is useful to distinguish the role of political management for two broad strategic purposes: building political legitimacy and support for managers and their causes, on the one hand, and building the operational capacity needed to achieve their goals, on the other.¹⁹ Further, with respect to building legitimacy and support, one can distinguish among the challenge of meeting routine demands for authorization and accountability, of making special efforts to expand one's own individual position, and of creating political room for innovation and experimentation.²⁰ With respect to building operational capacity, one can distinguish between the challenge of building effective influence across organizational boundaries (a kind of inside game often involving relatively few actors, all of whom are organizations) and the challenge of mobilizing action by thousands, even millions, of decentralized individual actors (a kind of outside game that involves different forms of public marketing).²¹ These specific challenges that must be met to close both the legitimacy gap and the performance gap in modern government are discussed in more detail below.

The Political Challenge of Building Legitimacy and Support for a Public Cause

Building legitimacy and support for officials and their causes assumes great importance right at the outset, with the obvious but fundamental point that public officials have to be sure that the goal they seek is something that is, in fact, *publicly* valued, and not some self-interested or idiosyncratic goal of their own. Viewed from this perspective, democratic political management begins with the idea of being accountable to the body politic, in the case of governmental action, or to the society at large, in the case of wider social action. Public managers in democratic societies are duty bound to make accurate reports about their aims and accomplishments to what has been described as their "political authorizing environment."²² This requirement helps ensure that their aims are closely aligned with the more or less clearly expressed aspirations of the body politic.

Creating Legitimacy and Support by Being Accountable. Although we don't often think of accountability as a form of political engagement, on reflection, it seems as though it is one of the most important forms of political dialogue among managers, politicians, and the public.²³ It is through the processes of calling an organization to account that the public has to speak clearly about what it wants from the organization and that those who lead public sector organizations can talk about what they think they should be trying to achieve.

As a commissioned officer of the U.S. Coast Guard, Captain Englebert was, in the first instance, accountable to her immediate bureaucratic superiors. She was assumed to be competent and resourceful, an asset in any mission that might be assigned to the Coast Guard, but she could not undertake any assignment that was not given to her. Her immediate bureaucratic superiors, however, were accountable to the statutes that authorize (and require) the U.S. Coast Guard to pursue certain purposes with appropriated money and specific authorities, the expectations and demands of political officials in the legislature and the executive branch, and the interests of many other social actors who have concerns about both the actions and inactions of the USCG. The broadest description of Captain Englebert's authorization is that she was expected to do what she could and was required to do to help her superiors achieve the legislatively mandated mission of the Coast Guard in today's changing circumstances.

That environment was changed by the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. A new and unexpected threat appeared in the world. She and her superiors were duty bound to think about how that new threat might best be met. Consistent with her understanding of her duties, Englebert immediately started to work on creating a position within the USCG that could provide some leadership in helping the USCG and other social actors search for and make a suitable response. Having put herself forward in this way, her bureaucratic superiors assigned her the job. She got what Richard Neustadt called a "hunting license" to see what she could do in the wider political environment to advance the mission of the Coast Guard.²⁴ This both authorized and required her to offer some form of leadership to the USCG and the wider society.

Arguably, this first step did not require much political management. To no small degree, the objective conditions in the world did the political work of creating an urgent need to which Englebert was responding. To calibrate the importance of the 9/11 attack in creating the political authorization for action, all one has to do is imagine how Englebert's effort to create a position focusing on port security would have fared had the 9/11 attacks not occurred. If she had simply been an officer in the Coast Guard with an intuition that the ports were at risk of a terrorist attack, she could have worked long and hard to "sell" her superiors on this vision and failed to do so.

Still, it is worth noting that the ordinary processes of politics, like the ordinary processes of the market, can play an important role in helping society make a useful response to changing material conditions in the society—and that a portion of that response comes from inside the bureaucracy as

well as from politicians. It is also worth noting that, while the crisis created the opportunity, Englebert would have to do a great deal of work over time to *sustain* her license and to ensure that the license was *used* to enhance port security. That means remaining accountable and responsive not only to her immediate superiors but also to a much larger public that has an interest in, and a capacity to act to improve, port security.

Building Legitimacy to Enhance Personal Influence. Public managers have to be engaged with their authorizing environments to ensure both accountability and responsiveness. But if they are assigned tasks that greatly exceed their formal authority, they have to find the means to widen the effective scope of their personal and positional influence. This means finding ways to legitimate the goals they seek in the eyes of those whom they hope to persuade to contribute to the cause. As noted above, that puts lots of pressure on the capacity of managers to persuade independent actors that the purposes the managers seek to accomplish are sufficiently important that the other actors will agree to cooperate even though they are neither required, nor paid, to do so—at least not at the outset. As Neustadt observes, “The essence of a [public leader’s] persuasive task is to convince [public officials over whom the leader has no direct authority] that what [the public leader] wants of them is what they ought to do for their own sake and on their own authority.”²⁵ We can extend this idea to include the idea that public officials have to persuade private officials and other individuals that *it is their duty to help achieve collectively desired goals*. It is through this kind of activity that a purpose acquires a legitimacy that is beyond the formal authority of a given manager.

Captain Englebert, for example, was given the task of orchestrating a large, highly decentralized effort to improve port security. In that effort, her personal authority and legitimacy seemed quite limited. She probably could not effectively reach an existing, coherent structure of authority, because there was none. Even if she could have acted with the full sovereign powers of the president, she would have commanded only one level of government, would have had limited influence over private parties, and would have been second-guessed by Congress. And that power alone would have had little sway with the international governments and private corporations that she had to influence. There is no election that could have been held that would have given her democratic legitimacy over the actors she needed to influence. She had to build her legitimacy in order to secure their cooperation.

Fortunately, she was not without resources to do this. Most important, she had the acknowledged urgency of both the collective task of increasing port security and the specific material concerns of the actors, who could

easily have imagined themselves as victims of a terrorist attack. To some degree, she could also claim to represent the interests of the United States as a whole (as long as her mandate held) and could have suggested that government might eventually have to regulate private action or come up with some money pay for port security enhancements. But the important question for her was whether this set of assets would provide enough legitimacy and effective influence to get the job done. This is particularly important, because the material tasks associated with enhancing port authority would almost certainly have required some social actors to absorb losses as well as enjoy gains, and all those who were called upon to do the work would have had views not only about the best way to do the work but also about the fairest way to divide the costs and benefits. She needed a great deal of legitimacy to begin the game; even more to be influential in the game; even more to become the broker and guarantor of a bundle of agreements that could constitute a fair and effective regime for producing port security from a large number of independent contributors.

Legitimizing Innovations in Governance and Operations. Building legitimacy and support become particularly challenging when public managers are forced to innovate and to experiment with untried methods. In our view, democratic politics is entirely consistent with the idea of innovation in government policies and operations. What is a democratic election about if it is not about the voters listening to new ideas about how to use the assets of government to improve individual and collective conditions in society? That is why each election results in pressures on reluctant bureaucracies to innovate in furtherance of their new mandate. Operating managers are politically appointed so that they can reach more deeply and more reliably into government operations and exploit the new ideas and pursue the new values that were ratified by the election.

On the other hand, democratic politics challenges innovation.²⁶ Citizens do not like to think that their officials are experimenting with methods whose results are uncertain. They don't like gambling with the state's money and authority and with the welfare of individuals and collectives who are affected by the uncertain choices about how to use these assets. Indeed, one of the reasons that bureaucrats have some independent standing and legitimacy in proposing government action is precisely because their expertise is viewed as a bulwark against uncertainty. We need bureaucrats to be expert. Otherwise the terror of the unknown will come over us. Even though citizens might be dissatisfied with mediocre results, even though they might understand that improvement requires an uncertain search for the elusive

production-possibility frontier, even though they accept the necessity for risk and innovation in the private sector, when it comes to authorizing government managers they prefer the status quo or the application of tried and true (but low-performing) measures to new situations.²⁷

For Captain Englebert, the aversion to innovation created two distinct problems. The reason is that she was responsible for leading two distinct innovative efforts. First, she was responsible for introducing an *innovation in the governance*. Before 9/11 the government relied on a particular set of policies and institutional arrangements to ensure the security of the ports. Following 9/11 those institutional arrangements became subject to review and no longer seemed adequate. They did not require enough attention or coordinated effort from all the network players whose contributions were necessary to solve this problem. Her challenge was to figure out a new process or structure of governance that could turn a latent network into an effective action network. Think of this as an *institutional* innovation in the structures and processes of governance.

Second, as Malcolm Sparrow suggests in chapter 3, she had to orchestrate a complex learning process to find the appropriate technical and operational means for ensuring port security. As noted above, Englebert and her collaborators did not know whether the objective was to protect the ports from attack, to use the ports to thwart attacks headed elsewhere, or some combination of the two. They did not now know, and could never be quite sure, whether they had imagined all the specific threats they faced nor the measures that would be cost effective in dealing with the full set of specific threats. They could not know for sure, then, exactly what actions taken by particular actors would be effective in dealing with the threats, nor could they be fair in distributing the burden of reacting to the threats. Think of this as the family of substantive *programmatic* innovations that could use material assets to successfully ward off the various threats to port security.

In this world of threat uncertainty, the task of politically legitimating the actions becomes particularly difficult. The relative power of expertise to dictate a desired result goes down, and the relative power of deliberating and reaching agreements in a world of uncertainty goes up. This created a particular problem for Captain Englebert, because she probably correctly assumed that her legitimacy rested in her technical knowledge. The idea that it would have to be created by a capacity for leading a *learning effort* among her colleagues and collaborators rather than the application of technical knowledge she already had imposed a special burden and stretched her professional skills beyond what is usually required.

Legitimacy for Operational Capacity

So far we have focused on the role of politics and political engagement in building legitimacy, support, and commitment to a particular policy initiative and for searching for the effective institutional and substantive means for enhancing port security. This focus on accountability, on building one's personal influence, on creating room for innovation is the part of political management that is concerned with defining and legitimating the *purposes* of public managers. This is important because it ensures that public managers are doing the right thing and because it generates a flow of fungible resources they can use in their work. It is less preoccupied with the operational question of how best to deploy those resources in particular policies, programs, and activities designed to produce material changes in the world.

Yet a little reflection reveals that successful political engagement and management is crucial not only for building support and guaranteeing a flow of resources for a particular conception of public value but also for efforts to *produce* that value. Two conditions make political management crucial to successful implementation as well as successful policy development.

Mobilizing across Organizational Boundaries. As the government has developed over time—as it has made significant changes in the basic structure of government by changing its overall scope, decentralizing responsibility from national to state and local and grass-roots levels, and shifting many of its functions to private sector organizations—the nature of the managerial work that focuses on operations and implementation has also changed.²⁸ As Elaine Kamarck observes in chapter 8, some of these changes have been made in accord with principles of the “new public management,” which has sought to reduce the role of politics in the system by increasing the role of private sector organizations and markets and to turn the government into a market organizer and regulator rather than direct producer. But none of these changes alter the basic fact that, when government uses public money and authority to shape production systems that produce goods, services, and conditions in which the public has an interest, democratic politics must once again appear to give legitimacy and substantive guidance to government as it carries out its purposes.

Indeed, to many writers it seems that the more distributed systems of production for public goods and services have *increased* rather than reduced the role of political acumen and action in ensuring that the public's goals are achieved. The private sector has many ways of making its private interests felt in the halls of government in ways that might end up costing the government

more money and producing less public value if public managers cannot defend the interests of the public. In order to do so, public managers have to build some bulwarks against the influence of private sector actors and legitimate those bulwarks as protectors of democratically established public interests. That involves significant political sophistication and action. It requires public managers to work politically to be sure they can resist private interests when they are advanced as though they were identical to public interests.

This trend has also been exacerbated by changes in the scope and character of the problems that government seeks to solve. Part of the problem is that many of the more pressing issues now span organizational boundaries. The existing structures do not fit; not all the resources and capacities required to act on a given problem are held within a coherent structure of authority that can act operationally to achieve the desired results. This means that managers have to find ways to operate *outside the structures in which they are placed*.²⁹ As they move across boundaries trying to engage other more or less independent agencies in the doing of their work, the key role of the political context and the utility of methods of political mobilization become apparent. In simply making an approach and seeking an operational partnership, managers are to some degree undermining or transforming the structures of political accountability that previously existed and that largely guided the actions of existing agencies. The only processes that can simultaneously weaken old systems of accountability and create new ones that guide public action more reliably to public goals are political processes.³⁰

Operational partnerships can require both political permission and political assistance in transforming the previously existing structures of accountability into forms of accountability that recognize both the new work they are doing and the new results they are achieving. They often benefit from having a political current running that can get them into the discussions and keep them there long enough to build more effective working partnerships. In sum, successful political management could help to create a context in which agency managers could approach key partners for assistance in the achievement of their mandated objectives, where the work of the agency could be supplemented by contributions made by other independent social actors to the achievement of the manager's goals.

All this is on display in Captain Englebert's case. The threat of a terrorist attack on or through the nation's ports was a new problem. One could say it has always been a theoretical possibility. One can also say that it has existed all along, in the form of pirates and enemies who threaten U.S. security through its ports.³¹ But surely the threat represented by terrorists willing

to sacrifice their lives while delivering technologically sophisticated blows to life and property is a new one.

It is not only that the threat is new, and not only that the new threat challenges the old institutional framework, but also that this new threat would likely end up challenging *any* plausible institutional framework. The reason is an effective counter to the position that the uncertain threat of terrorism to the ports will inevitably outrun the functional capacities of any single agency. Core constitutional boundaries will have to be breached. Any response will involve state and local as well as federal governments. It will involve private companies as well as governments. The response will likely be strung together through a set of complex agreements, both tacit and explicit, among many actors. The adequacy of that set of negotiated deals to deliver real safety will always be a bit uncertain until we see it succeed or fail against anticipated or unanticipated threats.

Because port security is exactly the kind of problem that requires a networked government, or a collaborative governance response, it seems likely that political management would have been particularly important for Captain Englebert. It is only through the work of continued dialogue leading to tacit and explicit understandings that a real capacity to protect can be constructed.

Legitimacy to Mobilize Decentralized Coproducers. Beyond mobilizing partners in other public or nongovernmental organizations, another kind of political management seeks to motivate coproduction that reaches out to large numbers of individual decentralized actors as potential contributors to social activities.³² The paradigm here is the mobilization of individuals to contribute to solid waste recycling by sorting their own garbage.³³ But other obvious examples are encouraging citizens to lock their cars in efforts to reduce auto thefts, or to get flu shots to help halt an influenza epidemic, or to participate in a designated-driver program to reduce the chance of auto fatalities.³⁴

There are two key ideas here. First and most obvious is the idea that we shift from a relatively small group of actors, who have to coordinate relatively large actions taken by the organizations they guide, to a very large number of decentralized actors who are never in the same room with one another and do not engage in face-to-face negotiations. They are targets of political mobilization, not collaborators. Second (and probably more important for the particular case of port security) is the idea that reluctant social actors are being persuaded to do something out of a sense of public duty. In short, they are the foci of socially created obligations that pressure them to do their duty rather than actors who are entirely free of social obligation.

The easy part of this idea is that individuals need to be persuaded to do something that is simultaneously in their own interest and the interests of the wider public. The question is how best to inform, how best to teach, how best to motivate.

The harder part has to do with remembering that individuals receive not only services from government organizations but also obligations. For citizens on whom government imposes duties—that is, citizens who are asked to do something that is not in their self-interest and not something that they would voluntarily choose to do on their own but that are nonetheless required by government—an important task becomes not just helping the citizens act in their own immediate best interests but also convincing them of the necessity of compliance.³⁵ Obligatory encounters between the state and individuals go more smoothly if individuals can be sure that their sacrifice is important and appreciated and if the imposition is fair.³⁶ This is a special kind of public sector marketing, the kind that focuses on obligatees rather than beneficiaries.

In the case of Captain Englebert, she had no direct authority to deploy. To succeed she had to find some means of imposing unwelcome burdens on the private and public actors who make up the port community and whose resource commitments and actions could play a decisive role in strengthening or weakening the defenses of the ports and in their capacity to thwart attacks aimed elsewhere. There is no small amount of self-interest she could call on to motivate actions to increase port security. The lives and property of private agents are at stake in port vulnerability, and the self-interest in protection can be animated, to say nothing of their desires to appear as good citizens in shouldering a public burden. But in the language of economics, the production of port security has many externalities and public good aspects that make it difficult to organize the production of port security through a kind of market system, in which a desired level of port security is specified, a responsibility to pay for this level of security is distributed among the beneficiaries (according to their benefit), and then individual actors are invited to bid for the bits of work that will add up to the desired level of security, with the resulting level of financial surplus or burden distributed once again. Moreover, there is a great deal of technical uncertainty about, for example, the nature of the threats facing the ports and the opportunities the ports have for thwarting other attacks.

This means that some kind of collective discussion and negotiation had to occur as the port community struggled to find a way toward more security at a cost acceptable to those being asked to accept the financial or operational

burden of making the changes. That negotiation would have been shot through with material self-interest. But it would also have been conditioned to no small degree by the public spirit created within the group.³⁷ A cost-effective and fair way to produce port security depended to no small degree on each of the parties coming to think and act as citizens of the community seeking to pool their knowledge and their resources to achieve the collectively desired results. Captain Englebert had to help to create a forum that emphasized the importance of collaboration and that allowed members of the community to search for the particular solutions that would simultaneously meet the technical demands of increasing port security at low cost and that fairly distributed the benefits and burdens of executing the particular solution that emerged.

On this view, Captain Englebert's problem was precisely that described by Dewey: to succeed in her important public task, she had to call into existence *a public* that could recognize and then act upon its own individual and collective interests. She had to help create and strengthen the capacities of the imperfect community that existed in the ports and to guide this community through a process that kept the common problem in front of it as it sought a joint solution. She could not have created a governance capacity to enhance port security without offering assurances at each step along the way that the governance capacity being built and used was *of* the community, *for* the community, and *by* the community that she sought to create and to mobilize.

How to Convene a Public: The Democracy Cube

Exactly how this legitimacy gets created, and how citizens more or less well organized in particular interest groups can be mobilized to act on behalf of public goals, are crucially important questions for government officials trying to achieve mandates or to seize opportunities to create public value. To no small degree, legitimacy comes from following procedures that are both culturally and legally understood to confer legitimacy on government action. Processes of consultation, respect for individual rights in both policymaking and operations, compliance with established rules, and so on are all important ways of building legitimacy and therefore public moral support for particular actions.

But legitimacy can also be constructed from technical expertise and practical effectiveness in achieving particular results. Indeed, there is sometimes a conflict between the form of legitimacy that comes from following rules, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the kind that comes from

producing outcomes effectively. Both can exist in real political processes, and the usual problem facing public managers is to try to amass legitimacy from both sources.

Finally, legitimacy can come from satisfying the particular interests of either discrete individuals or of individuals formed into like-minded groups. Individuals and voluntarily formed groups who like the consequences of government policies when evaluated in their own terms are more likely to view government policies as legitimate. When pressed, such actors might feel obligated to say more than that their particular material interests have been satisfied. They may have to say that they had a right to be consulted and to have their interests either considered or protected as a matter of democratic process. Or they may have to construct an argument about why their particular interests should be considered worthy of public concern against all others. But the practical point is that many social actors confer legitimacy on governmental actors if the actions the government takes satisfy their interests.

Through a combination of past experience—in particular, creating the oil spill control regime around SOLAS—and through an individual aptitude, Captain Englebert seemed to possess a knack for political leadership in the sense described above. She crafted a framework document and facilitated initial agreement by a wide array of disparate actors over whom she had little formal authority. In this section, we consider a general framework for mapping the major dimensions along which a public—or minipublic, as one of the authors has called it elsewhere—can be convened and collective decisions made.³⁸ Though Captain Englebert probably didn't have such a framework in her head, others lacking her natural facility might benefit from this more structured schema. The framework has three primary dimensions: who participates in this public, how they communicate with one another and make decisions, and how much formal authority they have to command the disposition of resources or behavior.³⁹

Participant Selection

One feature of any public decisionmaking venue is the character of its franchise: Who is eligible to participate and how do individuals become participants? In the universe of direct participation, there are five common selection mechanisms.

—*Open to all.* The vast majority of public participation mechanisms utilize the least-restrictive method for selecting participants: the process is open to all who wish to attend. The public meeting at the International Maritime

Organization (IMO) that Englebert hosted had this formal character. Actual participants are a self-selected subset of the general population. While complete openness possesses obvious appeal, those who choose to participate are frequently quite unrepresentative of any larger public. Individuals who are wealthier and better educated tend to participate more than those who lack these advantages as do those who have special interests or stronger views.⁴⁰

—*Open to all with selective recruiting and random selection.* This describes two participant selection methods. Some mechanisms that are open to all selectively recruit participants among subgroups who are less likely to engage. In this case, for example, it would have required special efforts to elicit the participation of residents who lived in port communities, or perhaps of the smaller nations that would be affected by maritime regulation. Randomly selecting participants from among the general population is the best guarantee of descriptive representativeness. Though it would not have been appropriate in this situation, initiatives such as deliberative polling, citizens' juries, and planning cells randomly select participants to discuss various public issues.⁴¹

—*Lay stakeholders.* A fourth method engages lay stakeholders in public discussions and decisions. Lay stakeholders are unpaid citizens who have a deep interest in some public concern and are thus willing to invest substantial time and energy to represent and serve those who have similar interests or perspectives but choose not to participate. Many neighborhood association boards and school councils, for example, are composed of lay stakeholders.

—*Professional stakeholders.* Finally, some governance processes that have been described under such labels as regulatory negotiation, grassroots environmental management, and collaborative planning bring together professional stakeholders. These participants are frequently paid representatives of organized interests and public officials. Most of the participants in the post-9/11 effort to secure the ports were professional stakeholders. Many of them came from other public organizations, outside of the Coast Guard, who had a stake in decisions and plans for port security; others came from private organizations such as shipping firms.

Communication and Decision

A second crucial dimension of institutional design specifies how participants interact within a venue of public discussion or decision. Informed by images of the Athenian forum or the New England town meeting, many treatments of political participation and deliberation implicitly conjure up idealistic deliberation: participants engage with one another directly as equals who

reason together about public problems. But the vast majority of institutionalized public discussions do not occur in this way, nor is it clear that they should. For example, if the main reason for direct participation is one that John Dewey once gave—that the man who wears the shoe, not the shoemaker, knows best where it pinches—then participants need do no more than complain to policymakers.⁴²

There are six main modes of communication and decisionmaking in participatory settings, and these vary according to the ways that individuals participate in the discussion and the degree to which an effort is made to forge a collective view. We consider first the different ways in which individuals can participate; second the ways that individuals can be organized to speak as a collective.

Different Forms of Individual Participation. The vast majority of those who attend events such as public hearings and community meetings do not put forward their own views at all. Instead, they participate as spectators, who receive information about some policy or project; and they bear witness to struggles among politicians, activists, and interest groups.

But there are few public meetings in which everyone is a spectator. Almost all of them offer opportunities for some to express their preferences to the audience and officials there. Think of the citizens and activists who line up at the ubiquitous microphone to pose a pointed question or say their piece.

Other discussions are organized in ways that allow participants to explore, develop, and perhaps transform their preferences and perspectives. They encourage participants to learn about issues and, if appropriate, transform their views and opinions by providing them with educational materials or briefings and then asking them to consider the merits and trade-offs among several alternatives. Participants usually discuss these issues with one another (often organized into small groups) rather than only listening to experts, politicians, or advocates.

Mechanisms to Forge Collective Agreements. Mechanisms employing these first three modes of communication often do not attempt to translate the views or preferences of participants into a collective view or decision. In most public hearings, for example, officials commit to no more than receiving the testimony of participants and considering their views in their own subsequent deliberations.

Some venues, however, *do* attempt to develop a collective choice through some combination of three methods of decisionmaking. The most common of these is aggregation and bargaining. In this mode, participants know what they want, and the mode of decisionmaking aggregates their

preferences—often mediated by the influence and power that they bring—into a social choice. The exploration and give and take of bargaining allows participants to find the best available alternative to advance the joint preferences they have. A decision at a New England town meeting operates in this mode when the townspeople have polarized over some heated issue ahead of the meeting and use the final vote simply to reckon their antecedent views.

Deliberation and Negotiation. This is a second mode of decisionmaking. Participants deliberate in order to figure out what they want individually and as a group. In mechanisms designed to create deliberation, participants typically absorb educational background materials and exchange perspectives, experiences, and reasons with one another in order to develop their views and discover their interests as individuals. In the course of developing their individual views in a group context, deliberative mechanisms often include procedures to facilitate the emergence of principled agreement, the clarification of persisting disagreements, and the discovery of new options that better advance what participants value.

Two features distinguish the deliberative mode. First, a process of interaction, exchange, and—we hope—edification precedes any group choice. Second, participants in deliberation aim toward agreement with one another (though frequently they do not reach consensus) based upon reasons, arguments, and principles. In political theory, this mode has been elaborated and defended as a deliberative ideal of democracy, while scholars of dispute resolution describe such processes as negotiation and consensus building.⁴³

Captain Englebert and her colleagues seemed to engage in a mix of deliberation and negotiation with port chiefs, private shipping companies, and IMO members in crafting a framework document that these parties could use as a foundation for increasing domestic and international port security. Though the case lacks details in this regard, the parties seemed to view security and the prevention of attack as a common goal and all were willing to take action to secure that objective. Some of the specifics—for example the technologies and requirements that private shippers would have to adopt and the question of performance standards for varied ports—were settled through some combination of reasoning and bargaining.

Many, perhaps most, public policies and decisions are determined through neither aggregation nor deliberation but rather through the technical expertise of officials whose training and professional specialization suits them to solving particular problems. This mode usually creates less room for citizen engagement. It is the domain of planners, regulators, social workers, teachers and principals, police officers, and the like. As the legitimacy of

expertise has waned, however, and the legitimacy of individual and political consent for the actions of government has waxed, this method has become less reliable as a method for producing governmental choices that are acceptable as legitimate by those affected.

Authority, Power, and Influence


The third important dimension of design gauges the impact of public participation. How is what participants say linked to what public authorities or they themselves do?

—*Participating without impact.* In many, perhaps most, participatory venues, the typical participant has little or no expectation of influencing policy or action. Instead, he or she participates in order to derive the personal benefits of edification or perhaps to fulfill a sense of civic obligation. Forums that principally affect participants rather than policy and action employ the first three communicative modes (listening, expressing preferences, and developing preferences) and not the three more intensive decisionmaking modes described above.

—*Participating to shape wider public opinion and build political pressure.* Many participatory mechanisms exert influence upon the state or its agents indirectly by altering or mobilizing public opinion. Their discussions and decisions exert a communicative influence upon members of the public or officials, who are moved by the testimony, reasons, conclusions, or by the probity of the process itself. For example, while the 9/11 Commission (the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States) was created by Congress to offer recommendations to lawmakers, its principal source of influence was arguably the enormous public interest and support that the final report generated. Providing advice and consultation is a third common mechanism through which participatory forums exert influence upon public authority. In this mode, officials preserve their authority and power but commit themselves to receiving input from participants. The stated purpose of most public hearings and many other public meetings is to provide such advice.

—*Participation for direct political power.* Less commonly, some participation mechanisms exercise direct power.⁴⁴ It is useful to distinguish between two levels of empowerment. In some venues, citizens who participate join in a kind of cogoverning partnership with officials to make plans and policies or to develop strategies for public action. Each public school in Chicago, for example, is jointly governed by a local school council composed of parents, community members, and the school's principal and teaching staff.

Figure 9-1. *Democracy Cube*



At a higher (though not necessarily more desirable) level of empowerment, participatory bodies occasionally *exercise direct authority over public decisions or resources*. The New England town meeting provides the classic example of direct participatory authority. In urban contexts, neighborhood councils in some cities in the United States control substantial zoning authority or financial resources that allow them to control, plan, or implement sublocal development projects.⁴⁵

The Democracy Cube

Putting these three dimensions of participant selection, communicative mode, and extent of influence yields a three-dimensional space—a democracy cube—of institutional design choices according to which varieties of participatory mechanisms can be located and contrasted with more professionalized arrangements. Figure 9-1 plots two familiar mechanisms of governance on this three-dimensional space. In the typical public agency, trained experts utilize their technical expertise to make decisions that they

are authorized to execute. The typical public hearing is open to all who wish to attend. While many in the audience listen to educate themselves, a few participants express their views in the hope that these preferences will be taken into account and thus advise the deliberations of policymakers. These two mechanisms lie on nearly opposite sides of the cube in terms of who participates, how they communicate, and the extent of their influence on public action.

Conclusion: Looking Forward to Creating Publics

Captain Englebert's basic challenge to enhance port security exceeded the parameters normally thought to circumscribe the task of public management. She could not solve the problem solely by properly mobilizing and organizing people and resources under her Coast Guard command. It was clear from the outset that she was responsible for trying to produce a material outcome in the world that required far more resources than she directly controlled.

In the business world, this is the classic definition of an entrepreneur: a person who pursues purposes regardless of the availability of resources.⁴⁶ Someone who becomes an entrepreneur assumes responsibility for mobilizing resources as well as deploying them. But Englebert was a captain in the U.S. Coast Guard. She had her own command structure to deal with. And in trying to mobilize action to protect U.S. ports, she had to confront a huge array of different actors. These actors were functionally able to help and had more or less interest in doing so but who were not her direct subordinates. They were accountable to others and pursued other purposes.

The challenge of port security, furthermore, was complicated by three critical problems. First, it was not at the outset clear what the most important challenge was. Was it to find ways to protect themselves from terrorist attack? Or was it to take advantage of their strategic locations and capacities to spot and thwart terrorist threats headed elsewhere? Second, it was by no means clear what would be the best means for dealing with either problem. Third, all ports were different.

This meant that there would have to be a continuous learning process. Englebert needed a strong regulatory initiative to get people's attention and begin doing the work. But that regulatory initiative had to be flexible enough not only to serve the political function of keeping independent individuals engaged but also flexible enough to adapt and change as the actors in the system learned about the threats and possibilities and what constituted an effective approach.

Unlike many other contexts, this one benefited Captain Englebert through its plentiful stock of good will and public spirit. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, all of the individuals leading and working in organizations that she relied upon realized that they faced a common threat. She also benefited from a prior history, in which many of these organizations worked together on other issues, such as maritime safety. Part of that prior history included the construction of international forums and routines in which shippers, port authorities, and naval organizations had become accustomed to cooperating with one another.

While favorable, these factors did not create the legitimacy and cooperation that Englebert required. Instead, they formed a promising basis upon which she was able to facilitate agreement on a more specific sense of shared interests, a common articulation of goals, mutually agreed commitments, and a sense that this network of organizations would move forward together. Captain Englebert seemed to have a remarkable intuitive capacity for creating this far-flung collaborative effort around port security. Someone less skilled, or less outwardly oriented toward the network of necessary partners, would likely have been less successful.

The approach sketched in this chapter sets out several conceptual guideposts that help to orient public managers to operate more effectively in contexts such as Englebert's. Generally, our emphasis on the importance of legitimacy and external capacities stresses a fundamental but easily overlooked aspect of Englebert's job: she had to mobilize legitimacy and support from a wide variety of actors in addition to the more familiar public management challenges of maintaining the confidence and goodwill of her superiors in order to ensure the flows of internal resources and discretion that she needed to operate effectively. Second, the mobilization of independent actors to help her achieve the mission assigned to her focused her attention on how best to organize a process that would engage those independent actors not only in politically supporting choices she made but also in doing the work that was required to enhance port security even when she could not directly pay them for doing the work—and where the regulatory regime that could require them to do the work was still developing and fragile.

The democracy cube could have been useful to Englebert's thinking about the kind of engagement process that would help her achieve her objectives. With respect to the issue of how much *power and influence* to delegate to participants, she probably would have seen what she intuitively grasped: namely, that the usual expert mode of decisionmaking was simply not going to work in this case. She had too little expertise, and too little formal authority, to be

able to make this decision on her own. This meant that she had to be willing to organize a process of decisionmaking that gave the participants influence. She needed their knowledge and their cooperation. The price was to give them influence over the choice.

Similarly, with respect to *communication and decisionmaking*, she could not afford to run a process in which individuals were silent or simply presented their own views. She had to stretch for a process that drew the interested individuals and capable parties into a dialogue with one another that was focused on exploring what each could do to contribute to port security and that built a sense of connection, interdependence, and mutual commitment.

Finally, with respect to *participant selection*, it would have seemed clear that she needed, at least in the short run, professional stakeholders who had either political influence to exert, money to spend, or (most important) some direct capacity to act effectively to enhance port security. She did not need a mass political movement of lay participants, since the attack itself would have done the political work of focusing everyone's attention. What she needed was the group of actors for each port, and for all the ports together, who, if they could reach an agreement, could enhance the security of that port and contribute to an understanding about how all ports might be made secure.

These strategic judgments about how best to organize a political, participatory process to help achieve her goals would have located her in a particular part of the democracy cube, the part that calls for the following: participation by professional stakeholders; and a form of communication and decisionmaking that not only pushed interested and capable individuals to learn, to change their views, and to develop a collective perspective about how to act but also that gave the participants a significant amount of power and influence over the actions to be taken by them and by government.

In sum, we hope these pages show that wide support and collaborative action from other public and private organizations as well as citizens themselves are important, albeit overlooked, dimensions of public management and leadership. To secure that support is to secure a kind of legitimacy, which can underwrite not just consent but also active endorsement and engaged cooperation. If we are correct, then public managers should adopt a perspective that encompasses the need to create legitimacy and collaboration beyond the walls of their formal authority. Making good on that perspective will require them to master a range of skills and methods beyond the conventional public management repertoire, including an understanding of the possibilities for fostering democratic engagement.

Notes

1. For the early discussions of the role of politics in public administration that established the distinction between policy as the proper role of politics in government administration and administration as a nonpolitical part of public administration, see Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* 2 (June 1887); or Frank J. Goodnow, *Politics and Administration* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1900). For more recent commentary on the indefensibility of this idea, see Frederick C. Mosher, *Democracy and the Public Service* (Oxford University Press, 1968).

2. Mosher, *Democracy and the Public Service*.

3. The first part of this process is often described as the policy development process, and it can happen in both legislative and executive branches of government. For a vivid account, see Philip B. Heymann, *Living the Policy Process* (Oxford University Press, 2008). The second part of the process is often described in terms of the operations of a public system of accountability. For a discussion of accountability in government, see Judith E. Gruber, *Controlling Bureaucracies: Dilemmas in Democratic Governance* (University of California Press, 1987).

4. For compelling, detailed accounts of how public bureaucracies manage their encounters with citizens, and the degree to which these encounters meet the standards of justice and fairness, see Jerry L. Mashaw, *Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims* (Yale University Press, 1983); Jeffrey Prottas, *People Processing: The Street Level Bureaucrat in Public Service Bureaucracies* (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1979).

5. On the problem of evaluating government performance and what can be done about it, see Mark H. Moore, *Recognizing Public Value Creation: Strategic Uses of Performance Measurement in Government* (Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

6. See n. 1.

7. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1992), pp. 166–94.

8. John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1927), p. 126.

9. For examples, see discussion of effort to increase the legitimacy and support of citizens for public schools and policing in Archon Fung, *Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy* (Princeton University Press, 2004).

10. John Alford, *Engaging Public Sector Clients: From Service Delivery to Co-Production* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

11. Stephen Goldsmith, *Governing by Network: The New Shape of the Public Sector* (Brookings Press, 2004).

12. Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, n. 8.

13. Kelman develops this idea in a different context in his efforts to transform the procurement processes of the federal government. See Steven Kelman, *Unleashing Change: A Study of Organizational Renewal in Government* (Brookings Press, 2005).

14. Stephen Goldsmith and Donald Kettl, *Unlocking the Power of Networks: Keys to High Performance Government* (Brookings Press, 2009).

15. For a view of managers working in the politics of the policymaking process, see Philip B. Heymann, *The Politics of Public Management* (Yale University Press, 1987), and his more recent work, Philip B. Heymann, *Living the Policy Process* (Oxford University Press, 2008). For a discussion of the wider role of political management in public administration, see Mark H. Moore, *Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government* (Harvard University Press, 1995).

16. R. A. W. Rhodes and John Wanna, "The Limits to Public Value, or Rescuing Responsible Government from the Platonic Guardians," *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 66, no. 4 (2007): 406–21.

17. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, eds., *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance* (London: Verso, 2003); Fung, *Empowered Participation*.

18. Archon Fung, *Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promises of Transparency* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

19. The distinction between the function of building legitimacy and support for a public enterprise, on the one hand, and building and deploying operational capacity to achieve the desired result, on the other, is a key distinction in the theory of strategic management in the public sector. See Moore, *Creating Public Value*; Herman Leonard and Mark Moore, chap. 5, this volume.

20. Moore, *Creating Public Value*, chap. 4.

21. Laurence Lynn developed the idea of levels of the game to suggest a widening scope of political mobilization in policy development processes. See Laurence E. Lynn, *Managing the Public's Business: The Job of the Government Executive* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), chap. 6. More recently, the idea has been extended to include the idea of public marketing as an important tool of public management for creating behavior change in large populations. See Janet Weiss, "Public Information," in *The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance*, edited by Lester M. Salamon (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 217–54.

22. Moore, *Creating Public Value*, pp. 118–34.

23. Moore, *Recognizing Public Value Creation*, chap. 3.

24. Richard Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 116.

25. Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan* (New York: Free Press, 1990), p. 30.

26. Alan Altshuler and Robert D. Behn, eds., *Innovation in American Government: Challenges, Opportunities, and Dilemmas* (Brookings Press, 1997).

27. The concept of a production possibility is a basic idea in economic theory. It describes the locus of points describing a specific combination of product and service attributes that can be produced by a producing firm with a given budget constraint

using currently available technologies. See Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser, *A Primer for Policy Analysis* (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 23–28.

28. Eugene Bardach, *Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship* (Brookings Press, 1998).

29. Goldsmith and Kettl, *Unlocking the Power of Networks*.

30. Bardach, *Getting Agencies to Work Together*.

31. Zachary Tumin, “From Safety to Security: The United States Coast Guard and the Move to a Global Network of Secure Ports, Cargos, Crews and Vessels,” Working Paper (Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2009).

32. Moore, *Creating Public Value*, pp. 117–18; Weiss, “Public Information.”

33. Howard Husock, “‘Please Be Patient’: The Seattle Solid Waste Utility Meets the Press,” Case #C16-91-1058 (Harvard Kennedy School of Government Case Program, 1991). For an analysis of this case, see Moore, *Recognizing Public Value Creation*, chap. 5.

34. Weiss, “Public Information.”

35. Tom R. Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law* (Yale University Press, 1990).

36. *Ibid.*

37. This is part of the difference between negotiation and deliberation. See discussion above.

38. See Archon Fung, “Recipes for Public Spheres,” *Journal of Political Philosophy* 11, no. 3. (2003): 338–67. The material in this section is drawn from Archon Fung, “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance,” *Public Administration Review* 66 (December 2006): 66–75.

39. Fung, “Recipes for Public Spheres.”

40. Morris P. Fiorina, “Extreme Voices: A Dark Side of Civic Engagement,” in *Civic Engagement in American Democracy*, edited by Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina (Brookings Press and Russell Sage, 1999), pp. 395–426.

41. James Fishkin, *The Voice of the People* (Yale University Press, 1995); Ethan J. Leib, *Deliberative Democracy in America: A Proposal for a Popular Branch of Government* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004); Graham Smith and Corinne Wales, “Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democracy,” *Political Studies* 48 (2000): 51–65.

42. Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, p. 264.

43. See Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in *The Good Polity*, edited by Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17–34; Amy Gutmann and Dennis F. Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1996); Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981); Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, *Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKernan, and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, *The Consensus Building Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1999).

44. Fung, *Empowered Participation*; Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, eds., *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance* (London: Verso, 2003).

45. Jeffrey M. Berry, Kent Portney, and Ken Thomson, *The Rebirth of Urban Democracy* (Brookings Press, 1994).

46. Howard H. Stevenson, "A Perspective on Entrepreneurship," in *The Entrepreneurial Venture*, edited by William Sahlman and others (Harvard Business School Press, 1994), pp. 7–22.